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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Studies  have  examined  the relationship  between  positive  and  negative  emotions  with  self-efﬁcacy,  but
we consider  that  some  theoretical  and methodological  aspects  are  missing.  In  this  study,  the difﬁculties
in  participants’  emotional  regulation  were  included  as  a co-variable.  We  analyzed  factors  undergoing  the
absence  of  affective  congruity.  An experimental  design  taking  the  type of  induced  emotions  (positive  vs.
negative)  as  independent  variable  was  carried  out.  The  manipulation  of this  variable  was  effected  with
the  combined  exhibition  of  movie/music.  The  results  suggest  that the  induction  of  positive  and  negative
mood  states  increases  and  decreases  respectively,  the levels  of  self-efﬁcacy.  This  was  only  observed
in  participants  in a condition  of  intense  or raised  mood  and  in atypical  or  slightly  accurate  items  of
character.  We  concluded  that  the induction  of positive  and  negative  mood  states  increases  and  decreases
respectively  the levels  of  academic  self-efﬁcacy  in college  students  and  that  the  difﬁculty  in the  emotional
regulation  modulates  the  effect  of  inductions  of mood  states.
© 2016  Colegio  Oﬁcial  de  Psico´logos  de  Madrid.  Published  by Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  This is  an  open
access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Los  efectos  de  la  inducción  de  estados  emocionales  positivos  y  negativos





r  e  s  u  m  e  n
Numerosos  estudios  han examinado  la  relación  entre  emociones  positivas  y negativas  y  autoeﬁcacia,
aunque  consideramos  que algunos  aspectos  teóricos  y metodológicos  no son  contemplados.  En  este
estudio  se  icluyen  como  covariables  las  diﬁcultades  en  la  regulación  emocional  de  los  participantes.
Así,  analizamos  algunos  factores  que  pueden  producir  la  ausencia  de  congruencia  afectiva.  Se  llevó  a cabo
un  disen˜o  experimental  que  considera  como  una  variable  independiente  el  tipo  de  emoción  inducida
(positiva  vs  negativa).  La manipulación  de esta variable  se efectuó  a través  de  la exposición  combinada
de  película/música.  Los resultados  sugieren  que  la inducción  de estados  de  ánimo  positivos  y negativos
aumentan  y  disminuyen,  respectivamente,  los  niveles  de autoeﬁcacia.  Esto  solo  fue observado  en  partici-
pantes que  demostraron  una  condición  de  ánimo  intenso  o  aumentado  y  en  aquellos  ítems  atípicos  o  poco
seguros.  Concluimos  que  la  inducción  de  estados  de  ánimo  positivos  y negativos  aumenta  y  disminuye,
respectivamente,  los  niveles  de  autoeﬁcacia  académica  en  estudiantes  universitarios.  La diﬁcultad  en  la
regulación  emocional  modula  el efecto  de  la  inducción  del  estado  de  ánimo.
©  2016  Colegio  Oﬁcial  de  Psico´logos  de  Madrid.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  Este  es  un
artı´culo  Open  Access  bajo  la  licencia  CC  BY-NC-ND
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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oulevares. 5008 Córdoba, Argentina.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pse.2015.03.003
135-755X/© 2016 Colegio Oﬁcial de Psico´logos de Madrid. Published by Elsevier Espa
reativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).There is evidence about the consequences of affects on cog-
nition, and diverse theories, with a degree of complementarity,
have developed in order to explain the relation between affects
and cognition (Forgas, 2001). One of these pieces of evidence
is the Informational Affect Theory (e.g., Affect Infusion Model;
n˜a, S.L.U. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://

































































How co mpetent  do  you  feel to  get a 
good performance  in an  exam? 
(Key or  Evocative Stimulus)
Memory of successul event 
Negative 
emotion 
Figure 1. Diagram of summation of activation.
Note. In this case, you could ﬁnd the memories of previous experiences of success36 L.A. Medrano et al. / Psicolo
ffect-as-Information Model), explaining that affect can notify the
ontent of thoughts, judgments, and decisions of people (Forgas,
001). Likewise, other lines of research were aimed at demonstrat-
ng that the affect is an essential component for the achievement of
 cognitive adaptive response (Adolphs & Damasio, 2001). In sum,
t is possible to afﬁrm that affect is an essential factor of cognitive
rocesses and that affect modulates the information processing in
ultiple domains.
Special attention deserves the analysis of the relation between
motions and judgments of self-efﬁcacy. This variable modulates
he choice of activities and behaviors; the patterns of thoughts
etermine the effort and the perseverance that the person devotes,
nd ﬁnally it lets organize and execute the necessary action courses
o reach a good performance (Bandura, 1997).
Bandura (1997) postulated that the mood state could inﬂu-
nce the self-efﬁcacy judgments in two ways, direct and indirect.
 person’s affective state could inﬂuence directly the self-efﬁcacy
ecause the emotional state could operate as a sign or information
o judge the own capacities. In relation to the Affect-as-Information
odel (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), people use their affective states to
roduce a quick judgment without trying to integrate the external
haracteristics with their own memory and the internal associa-
ions to generate a judgment. However, for Bandura (1997), the
mpact of this pathway should not be so important, because it
epends on the way this information is interpreted.
The major inﬂuence of the emotional state on judgments of self-
fﬁcacy is an indirect one. Bandura (1997) explains that memory
rovides the necessary information to make judgments of self-
fﬁcacy. The emotional state activates articulated memories with
he affect, facilitating the recall of successful experiences (when
he emotional state is positive) or failure (when the emotional
tate is negative), consistently affecting the judgments of personal
fﬁciency.
The idea that the intensity of the emotional states reaches to
istort the attention and inﬂuences the way in which people inter-
ret and recover information can be deduced from the Associative
etwork Theory proposed by Bower and Forgas (2003). According
o this model, there are emotional nodules connected in the brain,
nd each one has multiple situational detectors. When an emotion
s activated in an evocative situation, this emotional nodule extends
he excitation to a series of indicators which are connected. The
ndicators include physiological reactions, facial expressions, action
rends, and memories of events that have been associated with past
motions. As a result, when an emotion is activated, the concepts,
ords, topics, and rules of inference that are associated with each
motion are primed and more available for its use. In line with
his, the emotional state will put in the ﬁrst line some perceptual
ategories, topics, and manners of interpretation that are coher-
nt with the emotional state. These “mental samples” will act as
nterpretative ﬁlters of reality, introducing a bias in the judgments.
As suggested by Bandura (1997), the beliefs are formulated on
he basis of previous experience. If the person has had previous fail-
re experiences, he/she will feel less capable than if he/she has had
revious successful experiences. However, it is possible to hypoth-
size that the emotional state inclines the collection of experiences
f success or failure. For example, opposite to the question “How
ompetent do you feel to get a good performance in an exam?” there
s an activation of the concept “examination/test”, which belong
o an associative network that include connections with autobio-
raphical events of success (for example, obtaining a good score)
nd autobiographical events of failure (for example getting a bad
ualiﬁcation or not understanding a content). In turn, every event
s associated with an emotional nodule which is in contact with
ositive and negative emotions, respectively (Figure 1).
The phenomenon of the mood state dependent memory occurs
hrough a summation of the activation process motivated by themore accessible because this nodule is highly activated because of the concept of
examination or test (activated by clues of the environment or evocative stimuli) and
the positive emotional state.
active concept, in this case “exam” or “test”, adding an immedi-
ate emotional state, turning more accessible to selective memories.
Based on the memories of previous experience, the immediate
emotional state could affect the judgments of self-efﬁcacy. Hereby,
if the person is in a positive emotional state, it is more likely that
he/she remembers the successful event and, because of that, it
could be activated by two different sources, the concept “exami-
nation/test” activated by clues of the environment and the nodule
of positive emotion, and less probable that memories of the event of
failure since it only would be activated by one source (the concept
of exam activated by environmental clues).
Many studies have examined the relationship between posi-
tive and negative emotions with the judgments of self-efﬁcacy. The
methodological procedure used has been the same, i.e., the partic-
ipants are induced to experience positive and negative emotions
by methods of induction like music and/or movies, and then they
are asked to communicate the conﬁdence that they have to take
different actions. In spite of the similarities in the methodologi-
cal design used in some studies, the observed results are different.
Some studies report that positive emotions reinforce the beliefs
of self-efﬁcacy and negative emotions discourage them (Baron,
1990). Other authors do not corroborate this effect (Cervone, Kopp,
Schaumann, & Scott, 1994). Recently, Totawar and Nambudiri
(2014) suggest that the hedonism levels and utilitarian motivation
modulate the relationship between the mood states and the per-
ception of self-efﬁcacy. On the other hand, Jundt and Hinsz (2001)
have found that the mood state correlates positively with the beliefs
of self-efﬁcacy in a worker sample.
We should consider that some theoretical and methodological
aspects are not contemplated. First, many of the precedent studies
do not work with speciﬁc judgments of self-efﬁcacy, but they
request that the participants evaluate their beliefs to execute them
satisfactorily like intellectual, physical, and social general tasks,
i.e, without delimiting clearly the behavior and contexts involved.
Contrary to that, Bandura (1997) emphasizes that self-efﬁcacy is
a situational construct tied to behavioral delimited domains, and
consequently it should be evaluated by instruments that contem-
plate such speciﬁcity. For this reason, in the present study we
considered the beliefs of academic self-efﬁcacy of college students,
that involve three speciﬁc behavioral domains: 1) performance
self-efﬁcacy, i.e., the beliefs that the students have reached a good
qualiﬁcation (Pajares, 2003); 2) learning self-efﬁcacy, about the
beliefs to regulate their own  actions and the necessary thoughts to
reach the aims of learning (Zimmerman, 1995); and 3) social aca-
demic self-efﬁcacy, related to the conﬁdence that the students have
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Solberg, O’Brien, Villareal, Kennel, & Davis, 1993). From the
xposed above, it is hypothesized that the induction of positive
nd negative emotional states increase and decrease, respec-
ively, the levels of academic self-efﬁcacy of the college students
Hypothesis No. 1).
Besides, it should be considered that the exposure to a situation
r stimulus potentially emotional is a necessary but not sufﬁcient
ondition to induce an emotional response, and also the factors
nvolved in the perception of the stimulus (Palmero & Martínez
ánchez, 2008). Some people differ substantially in their aptitude
o perceive emotions and to control the mode and the intensity
n which they are expressed (Hervás & Jódar, 2008). Thus, in this
tudy the difﬁculties in the participants’ emotional regulation are
ncluded as a co-variable. Speciﬁcally, it is hypothesized that the
apacity of emotional regulation modulates the effect of induc-
ions of emotional states on the emotional condition (Hypothesis
o. 2).
Finally, some factors can generate the absence of affective con-
ruity identiﬁed by Bower and Forgas (2003). The Affect Infusion
odel proposed specify some conditions in which the affect can
nﬂuence and link the cognitive process, turning it into a coher-
nt direction with the affect. According to this model, the infusion
f affect is favorable when the emotional state is intense and
hen the task or cognitive judgment implies a constructive pro-
ess. Hence, if the strategy of cognitive processing is direct and
otivated (which carry a closed and directed process of search)
t limits the opportunity of affective infusion. On the contrary, if
he strategy of processing is heuristic and substantive, needing an
pen and constructive thought, it increases the possibility that the
nfusion of affection takes place. Opposite to this, we hypothesized
hat the effect of the emotional induction on judgments of self-
fﬁcacy will be most important in those participants having more
ntense emotional states (Hypothesis No. 3) and carrying a cognitive
onstructive strategy of processing (Hypothesis No. 4).
ethod
articipants
The non-probabilistic accidental sample consisted of 50 col-
ege students (58% female, 42% male), aged between 17 and 31
ears old (M = 21.13, SD = 4.58). After random assignment of par-
icipants to the condition of positive and negative induction,
oth groups belonged to similar socio-demographic characteris-
ics. More speciﬁcally, the age of the positive induction group
M = 21.11, SD = 4.52) was equivalent to the age of the negative
nduction group (M = 21.17, SD = 4.81), showing no statistical dif-
erence (t = 0.42, p > .96). Likewise, the gender of participants was
alanced between the positive induction group (10 men) and neg-
tive induction group (11 men).
The participants agreed to volunteer in this study and received
eneral information about the activities that they would carry out. It
s necessary to clarify that some information related to the hypothe-
es was omitted to avoid expectations that could bias the results of
he study. Once the experiment was up, all the participants received
eedback of results obtained
nstruments
Social Academic Self-efﬁcacy Scale (SA-SELF). It is a self-report
nstrument developed from a sample of the National University of
ordoba (Olaz & Medrano, 2007). The scale evaluates the students’
eliefs in their interpersonal capacities necessary for a suitable aca-
emic performance. The scale has 7 items, a unifactorial structure,
nd a good internal consistency ( = .84).ucativa 22 (2016) 135–141 137
Self-Efﬁcacy for Learning Scale (SELF-L). It consists of 10 items
assessing the students’ perceived ability to be involved in learning
processes such as planning, organization, and memorization. The
SELF’s brief Argentinean version adapted by Bugliolo and Castagno
(2005) was  used. This version was  translated from the original
version and the internal structure and internal consistency were
calculated ( = .81).
Self-efﬁcacy for Performance (SELF-P). It assesses the students’
beliefs in their aptitude to pass an exam and obtain good grades.
It has 7 items that measure the students’ beliefs in their aptitude
to pass a subject and to get a ﬁnal average superior to 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, and 9. The items are arranged in an increasing difﬁculty. This
instrument has been applied in the local population, and the results
allow us to infer an unidimensional structure and a satisfactory
internal consistency ( = .94).
Difﬁculties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS). The adapted ver-
sion of the instrument (Medrano & Trógolo, 2014) was used.
It is composed of 28 items that present different difﬁculties to
observe, evaluate, and modify emotional reactions. Exploratory
factorial analyses revealed the presence of six underlying factors.
The analyses of internal consistency revealed acceptable levels
of consistency for the different factors (values between .70 and
.87).
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS). This instrument came
from an orthogonal model which suggests the existence of two
independent factors: positive emotions (PE) and negative emo-
tions (NE). The adapted version of PANAS has an acceptable internal
consistency ( = .84 for NE,  = .75 for PE).
Procedure
An experimental design taking the type of induced emotions
(positive vs. negative) as independent variable was carried out.
The manipulation of this variable was  carried out combining movie
and music. For the induction of emotional positive conditions the
participants were exposed to comical scenes of the Argentinean
humorist Alfredo Caseros and the Argentinean group Les Luthiers,
and also an inspiring video of opera singer Paul Potts. Later, the par-
ticipants listened to the 13th Serenade for Strings (“A Little Night
Music”) of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart in order to support the emo-
tional positive tone.
The participants in the negative condition were exposed to frag-
ments of the movie “Memory of the Plunder” of the Argentinean
director Pino Solanas, which describes the problem of children mal-
nutrition in Argentina. Later, the participants listened “Threnody
for the Victims of Hiroshima” by the composer Krzystof Penderecki,
to support the emotional tone. The selection of scenes of the movies
and the songs was made on the basis of precedent studies (Eich &
Schooler, 2003). Both procedures of induction have an approximate
duration of 16 minutes for showing the movie and then 10 minutes
for music.
After the showing of movies and paralleling the music session,
the screen was used to show messages requiring to the participants
to complete the Social Academic Self-efﬁcacy, Performance Self-
efﬁcacy, Self-efﬁcacy for Learning and Positive and Negative Affect
scales, which were handed out in an envelope at the beginning of
the experiment.
As for the ethical concerns, at the end of the questionnaires, the
participants in the condition of negative induction were exposed
to the positive induction videos with the aim of ending the experi-
mental session in an emotional positive state.In order to evaluate the modular role of the emotional regula-
tion and the existence of a change in the emotional state after the
induction, all the participants answered the DERS and PANAS scales
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ata Analysis
The information obtained was analyzed in two  steps. First, the
nalyses attempted to evaluate the efﬁciency of the emotional
nduction, comparing the PANAS pretest and posttest measures
sing Student’s t-test. Besides, a multivariate analysis of covari-
nce (MANCOVA) was used in order to determine if the difﬁculties
f emotional regulation moderated the effect of emotional induc-
ion on emotional positive or negative condition of the participants.
ith this type of analysis it is possible to control the use of the lin-
ar regression to the variation of the dependent variables (in this
ase positive and negative emotions) produced by the covariables
in this case the difﬁculties of emotional regulation).
The second stage consisted of examining if the scores SA-SELF,
ELF-P, and SELF-F were deferred signiﬁcantly depending on the
nduction condition (positive vs. negative). For this, successive Stu-
ent’s t-tests were carried out for independent samples applying
olmes-Bonferroni’s adjustment to maintain the type 1 error at
 < .05.
esults
ontrol Sociodemographic Variable: Equivalence of Group
nd Analysis of Impact on the Emotional Condition
To control for the sociodemographic variables and other factors
hat could masked the variables, every participant was randomly
ssigned to every condition of positive and negative induction. After
he random assignment, it was statistically corroborated if the dis-
ribution was equivalent in both groups. More speciﬁcally, the age
f the positive induction group (M = 21.11, SD = 4.52) was equiva-
ent to the age of negative induction group (M = 21.17, SD = 4.81),
howing no statistical difference (t = 0.42, p > .96). Likewise, the
ender of participants was balanced between the positive induction
roup (10 men) and negative induction group (11 men), the equiv-
lence being corroborated again between the groups in relation to
ex (2 = 0.800, df = 1, p = .37).
Finally, to check that changes in the emotional condition were
ot attributable to the sociodemographic variables, a hierarchi-
al regression analysis was realized, with the variables of sex,
ge, and experimental condition being included sequentially. The
esults indicate that sex only explains 2% of change in the affec-
ive condition, F(1, 40) = 0.83, p = .37, including the variable age;
he explanatory value is increased by 4%, being not signiﬁcant,
(2, 39) = 0.85, p = .43. Only by including in the model the variable
f experimental condition, a signiﬁcant increase is observed, F(3,
8) = 21.43, p < .00, of the explanatory power, explaining 63% of the
ariability.
fﬁciency of the Emotional Induction and Moderating Effect in the
apacity of Emotional RegulationWe  did not observe statistic differences in the levels of posi-
ive emotions in the PANAS pretest measurements (t = .50, df = 48,
 > .62) as well as in the levels of negative emotions (t = .22,
f = 48, p > .83). After the emotional induction the group exposed
able 1
nvaried Contrasts of Signiﬁcant Covariables of MANOVA.
Positiv
Co-variables F Sig. 2
Limited access to strategies of emotional regulation 0.32 0.57 .01 
Difﬁculties in impulses control 7.15 0.01 .15 ucativa 22 (2016) 135–141
to the condition of positive induction obtained higher scores in the
scale of positive emotions (ME  = 32.85, SD = 8.24), with respect to
the group exposed to the negative induction (ME  = 28.82, SD = 4.20).
The difference was signiﬁcant (t = 2.02, df = 48, p < .05) and moder-
ate considering the effect size of the difference (d = 0.62).
By contrast, the group exposed to the condition of negative
induction obtained higher scores in the scale of negative emotions
(ME  = 27.07, SD = 7.02) compared to the group exposed to the posi-
tive induction (ME  = 16.28, SD = 3.37). The difference was signiﬁcant
(t =7.26, df = 48, p < .001, d = 1.95).
To determine if the effect of emotional induction on emotional
response was  modulated by the capacity of emotional regulation of
the participants, a MANCOVA was  carried out considering the con-
dition of emotional induction (positive vs. negative) as independent
variable, the difﬁculties of emotional regulation measured by DERS
as covariables, and the PANAS scores after the emotional inductions
as dependent variables.
The Box’s M statistic was  signiﬁcant (25.98, p < .00), which
suggests the fulﬁllment of the homogeneity assumption of the
variance-covariance matrix. MANCOVA multivariable contrasts
indicate a moderate and signiﬁcant effect of the condition emo-
tional induction (Wilks’ lambda = .388, F(2, 41) = 32.30, p < .001,
2 = .61, observed potential = 1). Besides, a signiﬁcant effect was
observed, although small, of covariables “limited access to strate-
gies of emotional regulation” (Wilks’ lambda = .799, F(2, 41) = 5.15,
p < .001, 2 = .20, observed potential = 1) and “difﬁculties in the
impulses control” (Wilks’ lambda = .805, F(2, 41) = 4.95, p < .001,
2 = .19, observed potential = 1).
The unvaried contrasts presented in Table 1 suggest that the
effect of the covariable “limited access to strategies of emotional
regulation” is only signiﬁcant for emotional negative answers,
whereas the covariable “difﬁculties in impulses control” only have
a signiﬁcant effect on the emotional positive response
Effect of Emotional Induction on the Beliefs of Academic
Self-efﬁcacy
In order to compare the self-efﬁcacy scales scores (SA-SELF,
SELF-P, and SELF-L), the participants were classiﬁed according to
the emotional induction (positive vs. negative), and no statistically
signiﬁcant results were obtained. Apparently, the induction of an
emotional positive or negative state did not generate an impact
on beliefs of academic self-efﬁcacy. However, when the analyses
with 20 cases that experienced a more intense emotional state
were replicated, signiﬁcant differences were observed in scores
of SA-SELF and SELF-L, and values of size of the effect was high
(Table 2).
Considering that SELF-P was the only dimension of the academic
self-efﬁcacy where no signiﬁcant differences were found, succes-
sive Student’s t-tests were carried out to examine in depth the
performance of this variable (Table 3). Comparing both conditions,
signiﬁcant differences were not observed in the easiest items of
the SELF-P (“to pass the subject” and “to pass with a grade higher
than 5”), nor in the most difﬁcult items (“to pass with a grade
higher than 8”, and “to pass with a grade higher than 9”). However,
signiﬁcant differences were observed in the intermediate difﬁculty
Emotional response
e Negative
Observed potential F Sig. 2 Observed potential
0.86 10.12 .00 .20 0.88
0.74 0.81 .37 .02 0.14
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Table  2
Effects of Emotional Induction on the Beliefs of Self-efﬁcacy in Cases with more Intense Emotional State.
Group
Positive Induction (n = 10) Negative Induction (n = 10)
Dimension of academic self-efﬁcacy M SD M SD gl t d
Social Academic Self-efﬁcacy Scale (SA-SELF) 39.4 10.13 31.2 9.17 18 1.89* 0.85
Self-efﬁcacy for Learning Scale (SELF-L) 80.2 6.61 71.8 9.37 18 2.31* 1.03
Self-efﬁcacy for Performance (SELF-P) 40.5 5.75 36.5 10.06 18 1.09 0.48
Note. In all cases homoscedasticity of Levene’s test was not signiﬁcant.
* p < .05 (unilateral signiﬁcance).
Table 3
Effects of Emotional Induction on the Different Items of the Beliefs of Self-efﬁcacy for Performance in Cases with more Intense Emotional State.
Group
Positive Induction (n = 10) Negative Induction (n = 10)
Items of SELF-P M SD M SD gl t d
To approve the subject 7.70 2.26 7.6 1.83 18 0.10 0.04
To  pass with a score > 5 8.00 1.88 7.3 1.94 18 0.81 0.37
To  pass with a score > 6 8.00 1.15 6.60 1.57 18 2.26* 1.02
To  pass with a score > 7 7.20 1.22 5.7 1.63 18 2.31* 1.04
To  pass with a score > 8 5.20 1.47 5.20 1.98 18 0.00 0.00




































Sote. In all cases homoscedasticity of Levene’s test was not signiﬁcant.
* p < .05 (unilateral signiﬁcance).
tems of (“to pass with a grade higher than 6”, and “to pass with a
rade higher than 7”).
iscussion
The results obtained at the ﬁrst glance would lead us to think
hat it was not possible to observe the inﬂuence of the mental con-
ition on judgments of academic of self-efﬁcacy measured in its
hree dimensions (i.e., social academic self-efﬁcacy, self-efﬁcacy for
earning, and performance self-efﬁcacy). However, recently a theo-
etical model called the third generation has been proposed (Forgas,
000), which allows us to understand in a more complex way  the
elation between the affect and cognition. One of these models
s the already mentioned Affect Infusion Model (AIM) (Bower &
orgas, 2003; Forgas, 2000). The AIM was developed as a compre-
ensive and integrative theory to explain both the presence and the
bsence of affective infusion in cognition (Forgas, 2000). This was
onsidered in order to explain some of the ﬁndings in the present
tudy. Likewise, the developments of Eich and Macaulay (2000) and
ich and Schooler (2003) were considered, indicating that there are
wo important factors involved in the relation between affect and
ognition, getting a better understanding of the results. In relation
o the above mentioned, on one hand, the task relative factors can
e found, which have been considered in depth by AIM to explain
he choice of one or another type of processing (e.g., noun or moti-
ated) and the probability of affective infusion in cognition (Bower
 Forgas, 2003). On the other hand, there is the relative factors in
he mood state (e.g., forces factor) described by Eich and Macaulay,
nd Eich and Schooler.
Regarding task relative factors,  the Affect Infusion Model of
orgas (2001) indicates that the tasks that should demand a more
ubstantial strategy of processing increase the probability to induce
he affective infusion. In this sense, a series of variables was pro-
osed that facilitate the choice of this type of processing (Bower &
orgas, 2003). Among these variables, the complexity or typical char-
cter of the task, which indicates that the bias of mental congruity,
as been found to be more probable when the complex and/or atyp-
cal tasks are present. This allows us to explain the results found in
elf-efﬁcacy for Performance (SELF-P), because the items in whichthe students were more successful in their performance (i.e., “to
pass the subject”, “to pass with a score higher than 5”, “to pass with
a score higher than 8” and “to pass with a score higher than 9”), did
not present a coherent bias with the mental condition, whereas
for those items in which the students are supposed to be less suc-
cessful in their performance (i.e., “to pass with a score higher than
6” and “to pass with a score higher than 7”) a coherent bias with
the mental predominant state can be estimated. Considering the
AIM, it suggests that the person uses a more elaborated processing
to answer the items of intermediate difﬁculty of SELF-P. As Bower
and Forgas (2003) explained, this type of processing is more able to
make a cognitive evocation derived from the affects that inﬂuence
the interpretation of the information.
In relation to the factors relative to mood state, one of the
remarkable aspects that has been pointed out is related with
the force factor of mental condition (Eich & Macaulay, 2000; Eich
& Schooler, 2003). It postulates that the probability to ﬁnd a coher-
ent result with the mental condition increases when there is an
affective manipulation of mood state, i.e., the more intense is the
inducted mood state, the more probable is the affective infusion in
cognition. This has been proposed in relation to the phenomenon
called mood state-dependent memory (MDM), suggesting that the
same is valid for the mood-congruent events. According to this,
when the 20 participants that experienced more intense mood state
were considered, an affective coherent bias with the mental con-
dition in the majority of dimensions in the academic self-efﬁcacy
(e.g., Social Academic Self-efﬁcacy and Self-efﬁcacy for Learning)
could be shown.
Finally, this paper suggests that the capacity for emotional regu-
lation could modulate the effect of the emotional states inductions
on the emotional state. The results obtained support this hypothe-
sis. As it was  observed, a signiﬁcant effect was obtained, although
it is small in covariables “limited access to strategies of emotional
regulation” and “difﬁculties in impulses control”, the effect of the
ﬁrst one (“limited access to strategies of emotional regulation”)
being only signiﬁcant for emotional negative answers, whereas the
second one (“difﬁculties in impulses control”) only showed a sig-
niﬁcant effect on emotional positive response. As Erber and Erber
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nvariant and automatic way, but in a controlled, manageable, or
egular way.
In summary, we can conclude that the induction of positive and
egative mood states increases and diminishes, respectively, the
evels of academic self-efﬁcacy in college students. However, this
as only observed in participants that demonstrate a condition of
ntense or raised mood and in those atypical or slightly accurate
tems of character. Finally, we also conclude that the difﬁculty in the
motional regulation modulates the effect of inductions of mood
tates, both in a positive and negative manner.
esumen extenso
Numerosos estudios han examinado la relación existente entre
mociones positivas y negativas con los juicios de autoeﬁcacia.
n general el procedimiento metodológico utilizado ha sido el
ismo: los participantes son inducidos a experimentar emociones
ositivas y negativas mediante métodos de inducción y luego
eben comunicar la conﬁanza que poseen para ejecutar diversas
cciones. Sin embargo, cabe considerar algunos aspectos teóricos
 metodológicos no contemplados. En primer lugar, muchos de
os estudios antecedentes no trabajan con juicios especíﬁcos de
utoeﬁcacia sino que solicitan a los participantes que evalúen sus
reencias para ejecutar satisfactoriamente tareas intelectuales,
ísicas y sociales generales, es decir, sin delimitar con claridad
as conductas y contextos involucrados. Por el contrario, Bandura
1997) destaca que la autoeﬁcacia es un constructo altamente
ituacional y ligado a dominios conductuales delimitados, por lo
ue, en consecuencia, deben ser evaluadas por medio de instru-
entos que contemplen tal especiﬁcidad. Por ello en el presente
rabajo se considerarán las creencias de autoeﬁcacia académica de
os estudiantes universitarios, las cuales involucran tres dominios
onductuales especíﬁcos: 1) autoeﬁcacia para el rendimiento, es
ecir las creencias que poseen los estudiantes de alcanzar una
uena caliﬁcación, 2) autoeﬁcacia para la autorregulación del estu-
io, entendida como las creencias para regular las propias acciones
 pensamientos necesarios para alcanzar las metas de aprendizaje
 3) autoeﬁcacia social académica,  la cual reﬁere a la conﬁanza
ue poseen los estudiantes para llevar a cabo comportamientos
ociales competentes en el contexto académico. A partir de los
esarrollos anteriormente expuestos se hipotetiza que la induc-
ión de estados emocionales positivos y negativos aumentará y
isminuirá, respectivamente, los niveles de autoeﬁcacia académica
e los estudiantes universitarios (hipótesis 1).
Sumado a lo anterior debe considerase que la ocurrencia de una
ituación o estímulo potencialmente emocional es una condición
ecesaria pero no suﬁciente para alcanzar una respuesta emocional.
eben considerase también los factores involucrados en la percep-
ión del estímulo. Tomando esto en consideración, en este estudio
e incluye como covariable las diﬁcultades en la regulación emo-
ional que poseen los participantes. Concretamente, se hipotetiza
ue la capacidad de regulación emocional modulará el efecto de las
nducciones de estados emocionales sobre el estado emocional de
os mismos (hipótesis 2).
Finalmente resta considerar algunos factores identiﬁcados por
ower y Forgas (2003) que pueden provocar la ausencia de congru-
ncia anímica. El modelo de infusión del afecto propuesto especiﬁca
lgunas condiciones bajo las cuales el afecto puede inﬂuir e incorpo-
arse al proceso cognitivo inclinándolo en una dirección congruente
on el afecto. Según este modelo la infusión del afecto se ve favore-
ida cuando el estado emocional es intenso y cuando la tarea o juicio
ognitivo implica un procesamiento constructivo. De esta forma
i la estrategia de procesamiento cognitivo es directa y motivada
conlleva un proceso de búsqueda cerrado y dirigido) se limita la
portunidad de infusión afectiva. Por el contrario si la estrategia deucativa 22 (2016) 135–141
procesamiento es heurística y sustantiva (requiere un pensamiento
abierto y constructivo) aumenta la posibilidad de que se produzca
infusión del afecto. Frente a ello se hipotetiza que el efecto de la
inducción emocional sobre los juicios de autoeﬁcacia será mayor
en los participantes con estados emocionales más  intensos (hipóte-
sis 3) y que conlleven una estrategia cognitiva de procesamiento
constructiva (hipótesis 4).
Método
Se llevó a cabo un disen˜o experimental considerando como vari-
able independiente el tipo de emociones inducidas (positivas vs.
negativas). La manipulación de esta variable se efectuó a través de
la exposición combinada de película/música.
Luego de la proyección de películas y al comenzar la inducción
de música aparece en la pantalla un mensaje que solicita a los par-
ticipantes que respondan a los cuestionarios de Autoeﬁcacia Social
Académica (ASA), Autoeﬁcacia para el Rendimiento (EAR), Autoeﬁ-
cacia para el Aprendizaje (SELF-A) y la escala PANAS, los cuales son
entregados en un sobre cerrado al inicio del experimento.
Con el objeto de evaluar el rol modular de la regulación emo-
cional y la existencia de un cambio en el estado emocional luego de
la inducción, todos los participantes respondieron a la escala DERS
y PANAS antes de la inducción emocional.
Los datos recabados fueron analizados en dos etapas. En primer
lugar se llevaron a cabo análisis tendientes a evaluar la eﬁcacia de la
inducción emocional comparando las medidas pretest y postest del
PANAS mediante una prueba t de Student. Sumado a ello se realizó
un análisis multivariado de co-varianza (MANCOVA) con el ﬁn de
determinar si las diﬁcultades de regulación emocional moderan el
efecto de la inducción emocional sobre el estado emocional positivo
o negativo de los participantes.
La segunda etapa de análisis estadístico consistió en examinar
si diferían signiﬁcativamente los puntajes del ASA, EAR y SELF-F en
función de la condición de inducción (positivo vs. negativo). Para
esto se llevaron a cabo sucesivas pruebas t de Student para muestras
independientes aplicando un ajuste de Holmes-Bonferroni para
mantener el error tipo 1 en un nivel p < .05.
Resultados y Discusión
Los resultados obtenidos en una primera instancia llevarían a
pensar que no pudo veriﬁcarse la inﬂuencia del estado anímico
sobre los juicios de autoeﬁcacia académica medido en sus tres
dimensiones (i.e., autoeﬁcacia social académica, autoeﬁcacia para
el aprendizaje y autoeﬁcacia para el rendimiento). Sin embargo,
recientemente se han propuesto modelos teóricos denominados de
tercera generación que permiten comprender de una manera más
compleja la relación entre el afecto y la cognición. Uno de estos
modelos es el Modelo de Infusión del Afecto (MIA). Asimismo, se
consideraron los desarrollos de Eich y Macaulay (2000) y Eich y
Schooler (2003), quienes sen˜alan dos factores de importancia impli-
cados en la relación entre el afecto y la cognición. En relación con
esto último, se encuentran los factores relativos a la tarea, que han
sido considerados en profundidad por el MIA  con el ﬁn de explicar
la elección de uno u otro tipo de procesamiento y la probabilidad de
infusión afectiva en la cognición y, por otro lado, están los factores
relativos al estado de ánimo descritos por Eich y Macaulay y Eich y
Schooler.
Con respecto a los factores relativos a la tarea, el modelo de
infusión del afecto de Forgas (2001) indica que las tareas que deman-
den una estrategia de procesamiento más  sustantiva aumentan la
probabilidad que se presente la infusión afectiva. En este sentido,
se han propuesto una serie de variables que facilitan la elec-
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omplejidad o carácter típico de la tarea, que sen˜ala que los sesgos
e congruencia anímica son más  probables cuando se presentan
areas complejas o atípicas. Esto permite entender los resultados
ncontrados en la autoeﬁcacia para el rendimiento (EAR), dado que
os ítems en los cuales los estudiantes pueden tener más  certezas
obre su desempen˜o no presentaron un sesgo congruente con el
stado anímico, mientras que para aquellos ítems en los que se
upone los estudiantes tendrían menor certeza sobre su desempen˜o
uede apreciarse un sesgo congruente con el estado anímico pre-
ominante. Tomando en consideración el MIA  puede pensarse que
ara responder los ítems de diﬁcultad intermedia del EAR el sujeto
tiliza un procesamiento más  elaborado.
En relación a los factores relativos al estado de ánimo, uno de
os aspectos sen˜alados tiene que ver con el factor fuerza del estado
nímico. Partiendo de estos postulados, puede aﬁrmarse que la
robabilidad de encontrar resultados congruentes con el estado
nímico aumenta cuando hay una manipulación afectiva del estado
e ánimo. En otras palabras, mientras más  intenso sea el estado de
nimo inducido más  probable es la infusión afectiva en la cognición.
i bien esto ha sido propuesto en relación al fenómeno de memoria
ependiente del estado de ánimo (MDM), cabe suponer que lo mismo
s válido para los sucesos de congruencia anímica. En este sentido,
uando se consideraron los 20 sujetos que manifestaron un estado
e ánimo más  intenso pudo corroborarse un sesgo afectivo congru-
nte con el estado anímico en la mayoría de las dimensiones de la
utoeﬁcacia académica.
Por último, se ha propuesto también en este trabajo que la
apacidad de regulación emocional modularía el efecto de las
nducciones de estados emocionales sobre el estado emocional.
os resultados apoyan de cierta forma estos supuestos. Como pudo
bservarse, se veriﬁcó un efecto signiﬁcativo aunque pequen˜o de
as covariables “acceso limitado a estrategias de regulación emo-
ional” y “diﬁcultades en el control de impulsos”, siendo el efecto
e la primera sólo signiﬁcativo para respuestas emocionales nega-
ivas, mientras que la segunda sólo mostró un efecto signiﬁcativo
obre la respuesta emocional positiva. Así, las personas parecen
o experimentar sus estados de ánimo de manera invariante y
utomática sino que lo hacen de una manera controlada, manejable
 regulada.
En síntesis, puede concluirse que la inducción de estados de
nimo positivos y negativos aumenta y disminuye, respectiva-
ente, los niveles de autoeﬁcacia académica de los estudiantes
niversitarios (hipótesis 1). Sin embargo, esto sólo se observa en
os sujetos que maniﬁestan un estado de ánimo intenso o elevado
 en aquellos ítems de carácter atípicos o poco certeros (hipótesis 3
 4). Por último, se concluye también que la diﬁcultad en la regu-
ación emocional modula el efecto de las inducciones de estados de
nimo (hipótesis 2), tanto en el estado de ánimo positivo como en
l estado de ánimo negativo.onﬂict of Interest
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